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Abstract
In the interest of learning from a unique and devastating disaster, this paper develops a
conceptualisation of generalisation as a communicative process. Growing from the
author’s experience of conducting and communicating an ethnographic case study of
the community response to the Grenfell Tower disaster, a tower block fire which
traumatised a West London community, and has been widely labelled an ‘unprecedent-
ed’ event, the paper considers ways of developing knowledge with wider application
from this unique case. ‘Communicative generalisation’ is concerned with the signifi-
cance of knowledge to epistemic communities rather than abstract universal truth.
Four modes of communicative generalisation are explored. By elaborating the multi-
perspectival nature of a case and its relation to its context, case studies may enrich
readers’ generalised other. Case studies may address an epistemic community by problem-
atising a taken-for-granted situation or theory. A case study can extend the situations to
which it may transfer by multiplying its audiences, and thus forcing its authors to take
multiple perspectives. It can also extend its meaningfulness by multiplying speakers,
facilitating expressions of diverse perspectives on the case. ‘Communicative generali-
sation’ distributes the agency of generalisation among authors, cases and audiences.
This redistribution has implications for the politics and temporality of generalisation.
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Introduction
In the early hours of 14 June 2017, the worst domestic fire in Britain since the Second
World War consumed Grenfell Tower, a block of flats owned by the local authority,
the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. Two hundred and twenty-seven
people escaped the blaze. Thousands of neighbours witnessed horrifying scenes.
Seventy-two people died, although the details emerged only slowly. Local churches
and community centres opened their doors to survivors and distressed local resi-
dents, offering shelter, information where they had it, and emotional support. As the
details flashed around the world’s news, crowds of people and hundreds of tonnes of
donations flooded the area. It was widely agreed by local residents and national
government that the local authority was failing to lead the response properly, and
various supportive and replacement organisations were sent in.
Most directly affected were those who were bereaved or lost their homes in the
most traumatic of circumstances. Individually and collectively, bereaved relatives
and survivors initiated an arduous journey of recovery ranging from intensely
personal matters to national fire safety campaigns. My research engagement, how-
ever, has focused on the response of the broader local community, not necessarily
defined by the formal disaster responders as bereaved or survivors, but who have
also been deeply affected, and mobilised a massive supportive response.
Local residents had questions about the safety of their own homes, the dangers
in the air they were breathing, the traumatisation of their children and themselves,
the treatment of their neighbours who had escaped the Tower, particularly their
rehousing, and the viability of the elected council and its officers. They raised these
questions loudly at public meetings with the authorities, in internal community
meetings and in their one-to-one meetings with service providers and politicians.
For many intense months, relations between local residents and the authorities in
charge of delivering the response and eventually the recovery (in emergency man-
agement language) were extremely highly charged, characterised by a deep distrust
on the part of local residents, and by fear, absence of leadership and inaction on
the part of the local authority. Residents were, and still are, in the extraordinary
position that they have to rely for the safety of their housing, the provision of
crucial public services and the ‘recovery’ of the community, on an utterly discred-
ited local council which is under police investigation for corporate manslaughter of
their neighbours.
Having informed myself about the devastation, the outpouring of spontaneous
support, the outrage and calls for accountability, as a concerned citizen, two weeks
after the fire, I first visited the area to pay my respects, in solidarity, and to try to
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make sense of a complex and significant situation. Although I had limited experi-
ence of sudden disaster, or of the North Kensington community, I recognised the
creativity and commitment of a grounded local response to a crisis, and the anger
of a community facing existential threat and a delegitimated government author-
ity, from my work with sex workers facing the public health crisis of HIV in India
(e.g. Cornish, Shukla, & Banerji, 2010). I was also thinking through community–
authority dynamics of distrust, de-legitimation, silencing/listening and calls for
accountability after disaster through the work of my PhD student, Nimesh
Dhungana, on accountability in the aftermath of Nepal’s 2015 earthquake
(Dhungana, 2019; Dhungana & Cornish, in press), and my own efforts to learn
about how community activism produces social change (Cornish, Campbell, &
Montenegro, 2018; Cornish, Montenegro, van Reisen, Zaka, & Sevitt, 2014). In
Tracy’s (2010) terms, there was a ‘resonance’ with my former experience.
In my early engagements with North Kensington community workers and lead-
ers, we jointly made sense of highly antagonistic, emotionally intense and complex
events, of how they unfolded and why. I took part in sense-making conversations
under chaotic and bewildering, fast-changing conditions, which were unprecedent-
ed for many of the community and official responders (though less so for seasoned
community campaigners and disaster experts). What I had learned in previous
work helped me to make sense of this unique situation (to generalise my past
experience to this new case), and to do so in ways that also made sense to
others. By November 2017, fivemonths later, I had submitted a Research Ethics
review form and had a knowledge exchange and research project underway exam-
ining the relation between community and official responses to the disaster. My
research engagement with this case thus resulted from my interaction with the field.
It did not come from the deductive selection of a case chosen for theoretical
reasons. Existing knowledge and frameworks with which I was familiar seemed
to answer to problems and tensions thrown up by the field. Two sets of theoretical
intuitions informed my research engagement with the case.
The first was that the contentious aftermath of the fire could be understood
through the lens of social psychological themata of trust/distrust and stability/
change, which I recognised from my and others’ earlier community psychology
research (Cornish & Campbell, 2009; Markova´ & Gillespie, 2007). From reading
the news as a citizen, I had a hunch that I had some intellectual tools (theories and
methods) to help analyse the mobilisation of community networks, the communi-
cative dynamics, the distrust and sense of disorder that arose. For example, I
witnessed pathologising interpretations from powerful figures (e.g. that criticisms
of the Council are made by ‘shouty people’, or that campaigners are simply irra-
tionally oppositional (O’Hagan, 2018)). I witnessed dynamics of distrust and
blame (e.g. accusations of community leaders colluding with authorities rather
than standing up to them; distrust of new-found volunteers who were being rec-
ognised clumsily by officials). Given my community psychological training, which
always emphasises that people need to be understood in their context, I found
myself doing things like problematising categorisations of people as ‘angry’ or
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‘shouty’, and explaining behaviour labelled ‘irrational’ with reference to history
and context and unfolding interactions. It seemed to me that some of the painful
flaws in the process (e.g. controversies over the distribution of resources) were not
necessary and could have been avoided, and I hoped that by documenting and
understanding the process, something might be learned for the future development
of local council–community relations and for future responses to emergencies in
other localities – in other words, we might create knowledge about this disaster
that would preferably not generalise to other similar settings, but, if acted upon by
future disaster and community responders, might instead prevent similar situations
from arising.
The second intuition was that a crisis triggers unusually externalised and public
sense-making and world-making. Dewey said in the context of the Great Depression
‘The intellectual function of trouble is to lead men to think’ (in Weick, 2010, p. 543).
Local residents had to cope not only with practical needs, but with making sense of a
shattered world. Crucial background assumptions for the continuation of normal,
everyday activity were obliterated by the fire and the chaotic aftermath.
Assumptions that homes are safe, that regulations are broadly sufficient, that emer-
gency services and authorities are capable of keeping citizens safe and looking after
them when things go wrong, or that wrongdoing is punished were assumptions that
could no longer be sustained. The role of the authorities and the safety of the
community were questioned loudly. Community organisations invented ways of
responding to new challenges and problems. My training in the social psychology
of knowledge, particularly social representations theory (Jovchelovitch, 2007;
Markova´, 2007) sensitised me to the community dynamics of sense-making. Local
residents were grappling with sense-making, as was I, as a researcher. Perhaps an
academic–community knowledge–exchange project would be fruitful.
While bringing these intellectual interests to bear, I worried about instrumen-
talising or objectifying people and their experiences. This is a deeply traumatised
context, with a life-changing significance to many involved. It is also national
news. It is also part of some professionals’ career stories. Many residents already
feel observed, labelled, judged or exploited. The ethical dimensions of making
knowledge about other people demand particular attention. To abstract people’s
struggles and triumphs and the complexity of the situation to ‘a case of distrust’ or
‘a case of closing down social change’ seemed inappropriate. I wanted to make
space for accounts, informed by the spontaneous bubbling up of sense-making that
emerged in response to the crisis, which could do justice to its situatedness, unique-
ness, its importance for its own sake, not just as an example of something else.
As well as university-based scholars, of course, there are others who also have
interests in systematic investigations. Emergency management professionals (i.e.
the people who make plans and organise relief and recovery post-disaster) were
interested in learning about how communities respond when the authority is
thought to be at fault – in a context where authorities often assume the threat
to come from ‘outside’, e.g. terrorism or floods. So, while this case was of course in
many ways exceptional, emergency management professionals expected that useful
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knowledge could be learnt from it. One of the initial impetuses for the research
project came from discussions with a local co-researcher, Cathy Long, about how
some of the mistakes could have been avoided. Research participants said to me
that they wanted to take part in the research so that something good could come
from this terrible event.
Informed by my research and knowledge exchange engagement with this par-
ticular case, in this paper, I aim to develop an answer to the question of how we
might develop knowledge with wider reference (generalisability) from a specific
case, informed by dialogical theory – so that some useful knowledge might come
from this terrible and ’unprecedented’ event. Specifically, I propose to think about
the question of generalisation as a communicative challenge: not as a product of the
characteristics of empirical settings (one ‘sending’ context in which data has been
gathered; one ‘receiving’ context to which we try to generalise), but as a commu-
nication between speakers and audiences, authors and readers. I formulate these
ideas at a middle stage of the knowledge cycle, having designed and conducted
data collection and some of the analysis, forging interpretations in dialogue with
data and local colleagues, but not having formulated eventual ‘lessons’ or conclu-
sions, and not being in a position yet to assess the success of our efforts at com-
municative generalisation.
Generalisation, abstraction and particularisation
The term ‘generalisation’ and its theorisation originate in quantitative survey and
experimental research traditions, responding to a concern that the findings of a
study should enable inferences about something beyond the particular data gath-
ered in the study itself – generalising from a sample to a population, or generalising
a finding from the constrained experimental setting to ‘real world’ conditions out-
side the lab (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000).
Much of the case studies literature adopts the language of representativeness,
giving central emphasis to ‘case selection’ (which plays an analogous role to sam-
pling) as a basis for making a claim of generalisability. A case is selected because it
represents a broader category of things or processes (sometimes with claims that
the selection was unbiased). The common claims made for a case are that it is
representative, anomalous, crucial, most-different or most-similar (Gerring &
Cojocaru, 2016). The case might be claimed to be a ‘typical school’ or a ‘region
with exceptional health outcomes’. Or sometimes two cases representing ‘extreme’
ends of a spectrum or ‘diverse’ instances might be compared. In the political sci-
ence (e.g. George & Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2017) and the more causal model-
focused sociological literature (e.g. Abbott, 1992), cases are treated within a
hypothetico-deductive model of science, as an equivalent to experiments in that
they offer ‘tests’ of a theory. Hence, in some instances, a random selection among
potential cases is recommended to limit ‘bias’. In this approach, the potential of the
case to confirm or disconfirm a propositional theory about how variables work, is
usually the goal (e.g. ‘Why is there no socialism in the United States?’; or ‘Do
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theories about civil war work in a randomly selected case of Japan?’; or ‘In ‘typical’
countries, how do variables of globalisation and welfare state retrenchment inter-
act?’ – Gerring & Cojocaru, 2016). In such a model, the contextual detail of the
case is uninteresting, or indeed a hindrance to the real interest which is in observing
the hypothesised abstract causal mechanisms assumed to apply across cases.
In his book ‘Making Social Science Matter’, Flyvbjerg (2001) questions the
appropriateness of this hypothetico-deductive tradition to understanding complex
human social and political cases, which he argues are better considered as multiply
determined, by a complex concatenation of contingent historical processes.
Flyvbjerg contends that there is much to be learned by exploring the concrete
unfolding of events in time. Those events are likely to be messy, and understanding
that very ‘mess’ is a valid endeavour, rather than excluding the ‘mess’ for a focus
on pre-determined abstract variables (Law, 2004). The concrete particulars of the
case, in its wholeness and its uniqueness, matter, and the case itself is worthy of
investigation, not only as an instrument to test an abstract theory. The main body
of this paper, below, aims to develop ways of thinking about resituating knowledge
that do not rely on making abstract, universalising claims, but that make claims
founded in particulars, which ‘generalise’ by speaking to concrete audiences’
experiences and knowledge.
Arguments about the possibility of generalisation have social and political, as
well as epistemic implications. For scholars presenting evidence from in-depth case
studies in settings where hypothetico-deductive reasoning is dominant, a challenge
about the generalisability of their study is a predictable response. Matthew
Desmond’s (2016) ethnography of eviction in Milwaukee presents a carefully
researched and shocking account of the devastation wrought by the property
market, especially eviction, for people on low incomes in one USA city. The
book follows the lives of eight families over some years, contextualised with careful
statistical research on the broader patterns of housing and homelessness in
Milwaukee. He claims that the patterns of evictions are similar in other cities,
suggesting that the experiences which he documents in the ethnography are
likely to occur in other places too. But more interestingly, he also problematises
the question of generalisability:
I wonder sometimes what we are asking when we ask if findings apply elsewhere.[. . .]
maybe what we are really asking when we ask if a study is ‘generalizable’ is: Can it
really be this bad everywhere? Or maybe we’re asking: Do I really have to pay atten-
tion to this problem? (Desmond, 2016, pp. 333–334)
In other words, there are political implications of claiming that something is gen-
eral or that it is exceptional, or too unique to learn from. In the Grenfell case,
official responders repeatedly said that the disaster was ‘unprecedented’ and excep-
tional. Of course, this is true in many respects. But framing it as exceptional
suggests that it could not have been better planned for, or dealt with any better.
If it is exceptional, if it does not reflect generalities, then there is no obligation to
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learn from it, or to change. And if the community is exceptionalised as ‘angry’ or
‘oppositional’, then the sources of the anger and the dysfunctional relation with
authorities need not be engaged seriously or prioritised. At a meeting of emergency
planners I attended, a senior government official particularised the Grenfell com-
munity, saying that, in response to disasters, some communities respond with
anger, some respond with appreciation of the authorities’ response and claimed
that the North Kensington community was ‘an angry community’. Again, this
particularisation exonerates the processes and actions that led to those expressions
of anger and shuts down an opportunity to examine how poor governance, mis-
management, miscommunication, or other failures might have produced such
anger, and how alternative official responses might avoid or mitigate such failures.
In contrast, many survivors, bereaved families and others affected by Grenfell,
emergency management professionals, charities and some local authorities are
eager to reflect on the significance of the disaster response, in order to ‘learn
lessons’ about contemporary disaster responses and how to improve them, for
future, non-identical disasters. In meetings and conferences, sessions reflecting
on ‘lessons learned’ from Grenfell have been organised. Charities have published
reviews and recommendations based on their experiences in the Grenfell response.
Once Grenfell United, the major group of survivors and bereaved had made head-
way with its work advocating for the needs of affected individuals, it turned its
attention to the cause of preventing such a disaster from happening again, by
campaigning for changes to building regulations, and remedial works on buildings
with similar cladding.
While instrumentalising a disaster to turn it into a lesson, or de-particularising
the unique human lives it affects, may entail ethical risks, it also seems ethically
and politically problematic to refuse to acknowledge that there is something to be
learned about broader, and changeable, structures or processes in which we
participate.
In what follows, I propose a dialogical perspective on the challenge of how
knowledge may be meaningfully resituated, which I term ‘communicative general-
isation’. I first establish a theoretical grounding for communicative generalisation,
and then go on to explore four dialogical modes of communicative generalisation
which I have considered in developing this study. These four are not exhaustive of
the potential modes of communicative generalisation, but they serve to elaborate
what communicative generalisation could be. They have themselves been devel-
oped out of my engagement with the concrete details of this case.
Towards communicative generalisation
The main presupposition of dialogical perspectives is that the mind of the Self and the
minds of Others are interdependent in and through the sense-making and sense-
creating of social realities, in interpretations of the past, experiencing the present
and imagining the future. (Markova´, Zadeh, & Zittoun, this issue)
Cornish 7
The interdependence of the minds of authors and readers is at the heart of what I
want to propose as dialogical (communicative) means of generalising from case
studies. If knowledge is intersubjective, the way it generalises is through the minds
of others, not through reflecting an abstract universal truth. From this perspective,
generalisation depends on the significance of knowledge to epistemic communities.
The challenge for the researcher, then, is a dialogical challenge of addressivity.
Addressivity is a Bakhtinian concept pointing to the character of utterances that
they are always directed towards someone; they are crafted to speak to a particular
listener or group of listeners (Bakhtin, 1986). An utterance does not have a mean-
ing outside of a communicative relationship. To be re-situated, then (or to ‘gen-
eralise’ to a new context), a social scientific statement addresses a particular
audience, in such a way that it can be responded to by that audience. The research
needs to speak to the interests and perspectives of its potential audiences, which
might include, for instance, psychological scholars, emergency planning practi-
tioners and/or local affected people.
This perspective also suggests that generalisation is not established until a social
scientific claim or argument is responded to by an interlocutor. If, as George
Herbert Mead (1934) put it, the meaning of an utterance is determined by the
response of the other, the social scientific statement becomes meaningful when it
elicits a response in a reader. Generalisability cannot be guaranteed by the research
design, the case selection or the sampling (though these may help). To generalise,
knowledge needs to be taken up, used, or acted upon, by other people in other
contexts. I explore four ways in which such communicative generalisation takes
place, in turn, in what follows.
Generalising as building a rich generalised other
Flyvbjerg (2001) argues that case study scholarship generalises through the devel-
opment of readers’ expertise in the workings of social institutions. Our ‘practical
wisdom’ (phronesis) grows, primarily, from first-hand involvement in the mess of
complex social reality. Just as surgeons become experts through a decade of prac-
tising surgery on different bodies, with different combinations of symptoms, under
different conditions, he suggests, social scientists become experts through engaging
with a diversity of complex, human social situations. In order to develop expertise,
Flyvbjerg (2001) argues, the next best thing to hands-on personal involvement is
learning from a rich detailed case study. Reading a case study which explores its
topic in its whole, historical, contingent and messy context, charting its tensions,
movements, controversies, and dynamics, develops our practical wisdom through
vicarious experience. The value of the case will be made when that expertise is
applied to a new case, with greater insight, finesse, attention to the important
details, ability to anticipate events and to act on them if relevant. This is a kind
of ‘practical generalisation’: it makes the reader better equipped to act in the next
messy situation.
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Flyvbjerg wrote about case studies which were not necessarily dialogical case
studies, not necessarily concerning self-other interdependence or multiple perspec-
tives, and drew on theories of expertise drawn from studies of technical skill (foot-
ball, surgery), more than social skills. When our ‘practical wisdom’ is about the
selves and minds and actions of other people, it has a particular character, and
different demands, compared to mastery of a craft. Here Mead’s (1934) concept of
the ‘generalised other’ may be a helpful extension to the idea of generalising
through practical wisdom.
A central concern for Mead was to understand the possibility of humans ‘taking
the attitude of the other’, which was for him the condition making it possible for
humans to have reflective selves, to engage meaningfully with others and to co-
ordinate in a mass society (Mead, 1934). He argued that, through engaging in
repeated social acts with others, we learn to take the perspectives of specific
others, which allows us to form an image of ourselves from the standpoint of
others, and thereby to adjust our words and actions to the perspective of others,
enabling co-ordination with them. In this process, we become effective social
actors capable of engaging meaningfully with the specific others in our environ-
ment. However, evidently, we are also able to co-ordinate with strangers. To
understand this process of re-situating our specific knowledge in a new context,
Mead puts forward the concept of the generalised other. Out of our multiple
interactions with multiple different others in particular roles and contexts, he
suggests, we develop a more abstract perspective from which to understand our
selves and others, namely the generalised other (Gillespie, 2005). For example, by
interacting with multiple healthcare professionals, we build an expectation of how
healthcare professionals tend to interact with us in a consultation, what kind of
information they want to know from us and how to prepare ourselves to get what
we want from the consultation. Meeting a new doctor, we use our ‘doctor gener-
alised other’ to help us to guide our action. As laypersons, we are continually
building our generalised others. As social scientists, from an experiential basis of
engaging in complex fieldwork situations, we develop a rich generalised other, as
one form of expertise.
Bringing this idea of the generalised other to the problem of how we advance
knowledge (or generalise) through case studies, in reading a dialogical case study
which brings to life the perspectives of others, we become more skilled at taking the
perspectives of those specific others. And reading across multiple case studies,
combining those readings with our own empirical experience, we may develop a
more sensitive generalised other. As Mead elaborated, taking the perspectives of
others enables coordination, as actors adjust their utterances and acts to the per-
spectives of their interlocutors. This process of adjustment, anticipating how fellow
humans might react to the next unknown and unique unfolding event, is a social
version of the practical wisdom (phronesis) explored by Flyvbjerg (2001). The event
might not be another tower block fire, or a community mobilising against the
threat of AIDS, but, for disaster-affected people, practitioners and social scientists
who have worked intensively with, and read dialogical case studies of, communities
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in contexts of existential threat, asymmetries of power, and distant authorities,
their prior knowledge may partially generalise to a new situation, using their gen-
eralised other to imagine the perspectives from which people act, and thus to
intelligently anticipate and respond to those perspectives.
This is how I interpret my sense of familiarity, or ‘resonance’ (Tracy, 2010), in
the Grenfell case, to which I referred above: as a generalisation of my understand-
ing of the perspectives of people coping with existential threats in conditions of
extreme asymmetries of power, and distrust of authority. That generalised other
prompted me to anticipate, for example, how the introduction of resources (such
as grants to organisations, or access to powerful decision-makers) can create ten-
sions and conflict, and that the definition of who is eligible for those resources is
likely itself to become site of contestation. In writing about this case, I aim to
elaborate the local perspectives from which the provision of resources becomes a
problem (as well as a solution), with the purpose of building readers’ generalised
others and thus their capacities to anticipate people’s responses in different, future
scenarios, to the provision of resources and to find ways of developing responses
that are sensitive to local conditions.
In this first mode of communicative generalisation, I have suggested that rather
than generalising abstract claims, a dialogical case study can advance the reader’s
generalised other, thus enriching the reader’s flexible, practical wisdom regarding
other people’s perspectives and thus preparing them for sensitive future action.
Generalising as problematising
This second mode of communicative generalisation focuses on the question of
‘significance’. Bauer and Gaskell (2000) propose ‘significance’ as an alternative
goal to ‘generalisation’ for qualitative research. Conceptualising ‘significance’ as
a communicative challenge suggests that researchers need to dialogically engage
with existing knowledge held by an epistemic community. An observation or a fact
is significant in relation to some content – a prior set of assumptions, a body of
existing knowledge. And it is significant for some audience. This frames the prob-
lem of generalisation and the task in a different way. The problem is not that the
case is unique and not generalisable, but that the knowledge created might be of
interest only to the researcher. The researcher’s task is to make the knowledge
of significance to a wider community of scholars, and we do this by making
connections between the case and wider theories and literature, answering the
‘so what?’ question.
‘Analytic generalisation’ or ‘generalising to theory’ is one approach that has
been offered (Yin, 1994). A case study might confirm or illustrate a theory, or it
might falsify a theory, in hypothesis-testing terms. Alternatively, a case study
might present a surprise in relation to theories or assumptions (Larsson, 2009;
Zittoun, 2017), expanding how we conceptualise issues, suggesting a new set of
problems, or new way of considering old problems or issues. If scholarship aims to
expand how we conceptualise issues, to help us to think differently, then a case
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study’s significance lies in how it troubles existing theories or assumptions or
taken-for-granteds, and offers something new and different. In this mode, a
completely unique case does not work on its own, but when it is brought into
dialogue with, or contrast to, existing assumptions and theories, when we establish
a ‘contribution to the literature’. To make generalisation possible, authors need to
work on the addressivity of their work, considering which epistemic communities
and arguments the work is relevant to. Cases are ‘made’, not ‘selected’.
Ethnographies often function as problematising cases. Classically, ethnography
is a good method for accessing the informal, the unwritten rules, the way things are
done – often in contrast to the formal, the official, the way things are supposed to
be, the way they are talked about. In policy-relevant settings, a classic ethnograph-
ic narrative shows that in practice, activities or interventions or organisations do
not function in accordance with the manual, or the official guidelines, or the
authorities’ claims about what is done and why. In this mode, in a way similar
to the ‘deviant case’ rationale, ethnographies problematise assumptions about how
things ‘should be’ and how they are actually practiced. They offer ‘facts’ in relation
to a policy expectation, or in relation to widely-held, or narrowly-held assump-
tions. William Foote Whyte’s ‘Street Corner Society’ (1943), an ethnography of a
Boston slum in the 1940s problematised the assumption that poor neighbourhoods
were disorderly, chaotic and hazardous. Through participant observation, Whyte
observed a strong social order, including the active management of risks and cur-
tailment of violence. Loı¨c Wacquant (2004), in an autoethnography of learning to
box, conducts a case study both of himself being made into a boxer, and of one
boxing gym in Chicago. Like Whyte, he shows that a practice (boxing), assumed
by some to be violent, unpredictable and disorderly, is in fact characterised by a
high degree of order, respect and discipline. So, he takes his own case of social-
isation as a boxer to problematise assumptions about boxing. I referred above to
my own efforts to problematise the particularisation of the North Kensington
community as ‘angry’ or ‘oppositional’ and of the disaster as ‘exceptional’. By
contextualising expressions of anger in a long history of neglect, silencing and
undermining of public assets, an immediate context in which the authority respon-
sible for the community’s recovery is under investigation for being at fault in
causing the disaster, and an experience of abandonment and lack of leadership
in the official response, expressions of ‘anger’ seem to tell us more about the sit-
uation and less about some intrinsic character of the community. Exploring the
structural conditions that allowed a fire of this nature to occur, in a block of social
housing, many of whose inhabitants were racialised as North African, brown,
black and/or Muslim, in this most economically unequal London borough, after
multiple warnings within government of the necessity of reviewing fire regulations
were ignored, challenges the idea that the disaster was ‘exceptional’ (El-Enany,
2019). The catastrophe was not arbitrary. Its conditions were set by structural
processes that continue to place other marginalised, racialised and stigmatised
communities at risk, and by a neoliberal deregulatory regime which treats fire
regulations as obstacles to profit rather than as safeguards of life. This case is
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significant in its own right, but it is also made more widely significant by carefully
detailing how the case problematises significant assumptions – about communities,
and about disasters.
Such research endeavours do their work of ‘advancing knowledge’ partly by
their engagement with and problematisation of widely-accepted assumptions.
‘Knowledge’ here is not a fact about a behaviour, or a claim standing on its
own, but an argument with a counter-position. The ‘generalisation’ here (under-
stood as establishing significance for an epistemic community) is dialogical. The
argument is interesting and the data meaningful because they challenge an existing
position or perspective.
Generalising by addressing multiple audiences
In February 2018, I sat beside a community organiser from North Kensington in
the audience of a public lecture at the London School of Economics (LSE) reflect-
ing on lessons from Grenfell. A highly-regarded scholar presented colour-coded
maps, indicating levels of socio-economic disadvantage in North Kensington and
the stark inequalities across different postcodes in the borough. His analysis was
about intolerable levels of inequality in Britain and the need for political change, a
position with which many Kensington residents agree, and he was apologetic
about his limited expertise in this case. As he talked, I felt uncomfortable about
the people I knew being objectified and characterised as ‘poor’ or ‘deprived’, and
about a still very current, complex human disaster being taken as opportunity to
‘learn lessons’ or derive a more general, ‘bigger’ point, when the immediate suf-
fering and ongoing complex demands seemed quite ‘big’ enough. My North
Kensington friend afterwards confirmed my discomfort, saying it was weird to
see her area described like that. The question of ‘making political capital’ out of
the disaster had already been a vexed one. Party political campaigning had upset
some residents who saw such campaigning as outsiders using people’s tragedy
instrumentally for their political ends (Renwick, 2019), while some campaigners
argued that the disaster was more than a personal tragedy and ought to be politi-
cised, because it was political already.
The self-other relations in an academic public lecture are somewhat complex.
Not only is the ‘academic-self’ talking to ‘academic-others’, but the ‘academic-self’
is also talking to ‘public-others’ whoever they might be. A community of
academic-selves can comfortably use common terminology, such as ‘disadvantage’
or ‘poverty’ and taken-for-granted assumptions, which do not work so smoothly in
different self-other relations. My point is not that social scientific concepts of
inequality or disadvantage are themselves wrongly objectifying or dehumanising.
Nor that people with lived experience of an issue are the only sources of authority
on that issue. Those are over-simplifying positions, with plenty of history. But
scholars often talk to each other about other people without thinking how their
terms construct those other people. When those others are a part of the
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conversation, the addressivity demands are different. The possibility of speaking to
two audiences at once introduces tensions and challenges.
One of those challenges may be to do with generalisation. Dialogue implies
respecting the unique particularity of dialogue partners (Markova´, Zadeh &
Zittoun, this issue), some of whom may be a part of, or representative of, the
case under consideration. Treating the case as an instance of something more
general tends to objectify it, to misrecognise its particularity. When ‘experts’ or
‘authorities’ talk about ‘the disadvantaged’ or ‘empowering poor people’ or
‘engaging with the community’, ‘giving them a voice’, it never sounds as if there
is a person who would match or identify that description in the conversation. How
would the speaker feel if the language was reversed to refer to oneself ‘being given
a voice’ or ‘being an instance of the disadvantaged’? Of course it is possible to
abstract and talk politics with concerned people: everyday conversation does it all
the time. Language can be otherising to different degrees and in different ways.
This discussion brings me to suggest a different kind of generalisation, a con-
sideration of whether one’s argument and language is capable of addressing mul-
tiple audiences. For example, one might ask: Could I make my argument in front
of the people I have engaged with as part of the research, as well as in front of my
scholarly community? Can I formulate a statement that I could make to represen-
tatives of the hated institutions widely seen to be culpable, as well as to represen-
tatives of the affected community? My argument is not that a scholar must be
capable of doing so. Contested situations are multi-perspectival, and there does
not exist a single universal truth or a middle ground that all sides would agree on.
Addressing multiple audiences does not mean that each audience will agree or
endorse or like what is being said. But the awareness of potential multiple audi-
ences can be a stimulus for careful and accountable thinking. And following the
ethical commitment of dialogicality to recognising the uniqueness and humanity of
the other (Markova´, Zadeh, & Zittoun, this issue), I would argue that all too often
we continue to speak of human subjects as objects and that it would improve our
work to consider people we write about as our dialogue partners, audiences for our
analyses. Doing so would be a technique for making our research less objectifying
and othering, and a technique for addressing multiple audiences simultaneously,
with the possibility of resituating knowledge for multiple dialogue partners. The
question would be ‘can my argument address multiple audiences?’ rather than
‘does my research generalise?’
Generalising by hearing multiple speakers
The above mode of generalising multiplies our audiences. On the other hand, we
might also multiply the speakers. If the social world is multi-perspectival, a rich
understanding of it, a good generalised other, comes from hearing those multiple
perspectives.
‘Maximising variation’ is an approach to sampling cited by qualitative research-
ers intended to contribute to generalisability (Larsson, 2009). The argument goes
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that there is likely to be a diversity of beliefs or experiences in a population or
setting, and while qualitative research may not need to claim representativeness of
the population (through, say a random sample), it should avoid sampling from
such a narrow set of experience that its findings refer only to that limited portion of
reality. Using theoretical criteria (theoretical sampling, Glaser & Strauss, 1967),
the researcher samples for diversity, thereby increasing the likelihood that the
findings reflect a wide range of experience, and thus the findings may better gen-
eralise to a wider range of cases or settings. This approach is resonant with a
concern with sampling bias in quantitative research.
From a dialogical point of view, it is necessary to recognise that there are
multiple, interdependent perspectives in any social field, and it usually productive
to investigate those multiple perspectives, for example, when research interests
concern dialogical questions of tensions, contestation, negotiation, collaboration
or conflict (Coultas, this issue). The purpose of doing so, however, is not so much
to inch towards a more complete reflection of the whole case, but to investigate the
inter-perspectival dynamics that produce the phenomena of interest. This theoret-
ical perspective suggests that the kind of theoretical sampling to be employed
would not start with static categories such as demographics, but by thinking
about the nature of the pairings or groupings of interdependent perspectives
that are active in a case. Sampling multiple diverse perspectives at the outset of
research is an established way to make it possible for the outcome of the research
to communicate a rich and nuanced situation (or a rich generalised other). Less
widely enacted is the possibility of hearing multiple speakers as the outcome of a
piece of research.
In the Grenfell context, the politics of representation have been bitterly con-
tested. An event that is at once of intense personal concern is also an event of
national significance. The world’s media appeared and reappeared, telling versions
of events which felt disconnected from local people’s experience, or offended them,
or in some cases, led to their being criticised or hounded on social media.
Authorities repeatedly seemed to fail to understand the nature of the community
and its needs. And a book length analysis, authoritatively presented and titled ‘The
Tower’ (O’Hagan, 2018) aggressively undermined the integrity of local activists
and their perspectives, raising intense anger, and a sense of the epistemic injustice
of the question of whose voice had access to mass media amplification and
whose did not.
In this context, as a researcher, I am intensely aware of the politics of represent-
ing others. I will write my interpretation of events, acknowledging it is my version,
situated in a particular perspective. But with collaborators, we are also exploring
ways of facilitating versions authored by local perspectives. We have drawn togeth-
er ‘timelines’ of the community and official responses to the Grenfell Tower fire.
The timelines record events in the unfolding of the spontaneous community
response, the meetings, letters and decisions marking the development of the offi-
cial response and the interaction between the two. They also catalogue documen-
tation (photographs, announcements, flyers, meeting minutes, policy documents)
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for each event. In the interest of facilitating multiple speakers, I am working with a
participatory artist and a local co-researcher to develop visualisations of the time-
lines for public engagement, which is sufficiently sparse to allow individual stories
and interpretation, but which also offers milestones, and documentary evidence
that can be drawn on. We aim to offer a scaffold for people to respond, telling their
own story, adding personal responses or debating with the significance of events
which we have selected for inclusion. Local people who have been involved in the
response have expressed interest in using such a format to make sense of their own
experience in a very chaotic and overwhelming period, and also to refute or debate
stigmatising accounts of their community or official accounts that do not match
their experience. We also invite them to add to the events covered in the timeline.
As a result, we hope to produce timelines that reflects multiple local voices. And we
hope to facilitate multiple local versions of the unfolding of events, as an outcome
of the research.
This kind of multivoiced storytelling is not ‘generalisation’ in the sense of cre-
ating a ‘more general’ or ‘more uniform’ or ‘average’ or ‘abstract’ understanding.
Instead, it aims to allow the listener or reader to develop a complex understanding,
which incorporates multiple, perhaps inconsistent perspectives.
Conclusion: Temporality and agency in dialogical generalisation
In this paper, I have sought to develop the idea of ‘communicative generalisation’,
through exploring four processes through which knowledge based in empirical
research can speak to audiences in other contexts. These four modes of commu-
nicative generalisation are not comprehensive or exhaustive of the possibilities of
communicative generalisation. They are not the result of an over-arching ‘top-
down’ theoretical project of mapping out the whole field, but have arisen
‘bottom-up’ from my engagement with a particular case. There are of course
other modes through which research can achieve communicative generalisation,
which have not been explored here. For instance, ‘analytical generalization’ refers
to the process of ‘generalising to theory’, where empirical cases are connected
together by virtue of advancing theory. This could be considered a form of ‘com-
municative generalisation’, as it connects with the interests of an epistemic com-
munity by referring to and advancing common theoretical reference points. There
are surely numerous other means through which scholars strive to make their work
communicate to others, whose elaboration could help to develop further the idea
of communicative validity.
This communicative perspective has implications for the temporality, the
agency and the politics in generalisation. It suggests that generalisation happens
not at the final stage of a study, but right at the start. Past knowledge gains
generality if it answers to a new case. The significance of a case to the researcher,
and to implied readers, evolves and changes with the development of the research
and analysis. A case, in its concrete particulars, can call for some kinds of theoris-
ing over others, and thus the case itself, in its uniqueness, has agency in this
Cornish 15
relation. This is how I described my arrival at studying Grenfell as a case: in
encountering the field, my prior knowledge generalised to that field, or answered
to that field, helping to make sense of it. Others have suggested forms of ‘reader
generalisation’, in which the reader determines whether a ‘transfer’ between empir-
ical settings or between case and analytical claims is appropriate (Kvale, 1996;
Seale, 1999; Tracy, 2010). Building on this idea, I have proposed that the dialogical
concept of addressivity offers a useful theorisation of the relation between
researcher and audience in ‘reader generalisation’. If generalisation is communi-
cative, it is subject to the power dynamics of communication: there is a politics of
which knowledge is remembered, forgotten, silenced or generalised. There is a
politics of who has power to recognise an advancement of knowledge. Larsson
(2009) notes that the move of ‘reader generalisation’ changes the power relation
between researcher and audience, in that the audience is the judge of transferabil-
ity. Readers have agency to determine the generalisability of the case.
‘Communicative generalisation’ thus recognises a distribution of agency among
authors, cases and readers, in keeping with a dialogical ethical commitment to
respecting the uniqueness and humanity of dialogue partners.
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